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Resumen: Mi propósito es utilizar los conceptos, propuestos por de Miranda Fric-
ker, de “injusticia testimonial” e “injusticia hermenéutica” para establecer una distinción 
entre la política de tolerancia y la política de solidaridad en el liberalismo rortiano. Me 
centraré en la política de solidaridad interpretada como desplegándose en dos fases de la 
imaginación: la fase de la imaginación crítica y la de la imaginación utópica. Defiendo 
que la imaginación crítica puede ser entendida como enfocada en superar la injusticia 
hermenéutica a través de lo que denomino redescripción liberal. Por último, critico 
el proyecto rortiano a partir de diagnosticar una tendencia inadecuada a restringir la 
imaginación crítica sobre la base de adoptar un criterio que se centra en supuestas fallas 
en el desarrollo de la imaginación utópica, y que choca con la pretensión de superar la 
injusticia hermenéutica
Palabras clave: Injusticia hermenéutica, Redescripción liberal, Imaginación crí-
tica, Imaginación utópica, Marxismo.
1. Introduction
Contingency of language is the formula that sums up Rorty’s view of the 
way we get along in the world. He echoes Davidson’s words: “we have erased the 
boundary between knowledge of a language and knowledge of our walk along the 
world in general” (Davidson, 1986: 445-46). That formula, in accordance with 
the idea that the self is nothing but a de-centred network of beliefs and desires 
(an idea which, in turn, is resumed in the formula that refers to the “contingency 
of the selfhood”), is a direct result of the antirepresentationalist move proposed 
by Rorty. In order to arrive from this antirepresentationalism to the third formula 
at stake, that of the contingency of a liberal community, Rorty appeals to the 
well-known concept of ethnocentrism.
According to Rorty, the antirepresentationalist starting point leads to the 
ethnocentric conclusion that: “no description of how things are from a God’s-
eye point of view, no skyhook provided by some contemporary or yet-to-be-
developed science, is going to free us from the contingency of having been 
acculturated as we were”(Rorty, 1991a: 13). Rorty uses this conclusion to state 
a fact and to make an assessment.
The fact that Rorty extracts from the inevitability of ethnocentrism, of pro-
ving that the only fruitful way that humans have of making sense of life is “telling 
the story of their contribution to a community” (Ibid., 21), is that we cannot 
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but be loyal to the socio-political, democratic and liberal context in which we 
were acculturated. In Rorty’s view, it is not about a transcendental deduction of 
democratic politics from antirepresentationalist premises; rather, it is a warning 
for all those who decide to show themselves as outsiders and who, to showcase 
their laterality, appeal to contact specific non-human realities, both transhisto-
rical and extra cultural. 
Dogmatism –the inability to allow one’s doxastic assumptions to be challen-
ged– is the main issue of ethnocentrism. The only way of steering away from the 
ethnos in which we were acculturated is through contact with unfamiliar ideas. 
It is at this point when Rorty assesses democratic and liberal culture. To him, 
[it] has found a strategy for avoiding the disadvantage of ethnocentrism. 
This is to be open to encounters with other actual and possible cultures, and 
to make this openness central to its self-image. This culture is an ethnos 
which prides itself on its suspicion of ethnocentrism — on its ability to 
increase the freedom and openness of encounters, rather than on its posses-
sion of truth. (Ibid.: 2) 
Consequently, being loyal to the culture of liberalism means being loyal to 
the idea that it is not suitable to remain fixed to the same acculturation process 
if this converges in unwillingness to maintain encounters of genuine communi-
cation with representatives of different cultures. Barry Allen has appropriately 
pointed out that Rorty teaches us that ethnocentrism is upheld by liberalism 
itself. Allen says
Our ethnocentrism is different from everybody else’s. When we are eth-
nocentric, we are not ethnocentric. When we are true to our traditions, we 
are open to other traditions, when we are interested in ourselves, we are 
interested in what is new and different, happy (at our best) to accommodate 
and learn from it. (Allen, 2000: 224)  
It is clear, then, that there is a strong link between Rorty’s epistemological 
stance and his political one, thus showing himself as a faithful example of the 
316 Federico Penelas
ÉNDOXA: Series Filosóficas, n.o 43, 2019, pp. 313 -333. UNED, Madrid
liberal antirepresentationalist tradition launched by Dewey. Faced with the dog-
matic danger entailed by ethnocentrism, one should say that such danger doesn’t 
exist since it is dissolved by the liberal ethnos (although the openness to other 
communities imposed on us by such ethnos shouldn’t give way to the idea that 
we see ourselves with the need to be universal interlocutors).1 As to the assertion 
that ethnocentrism becomes innocuous in a liberal culture, I believe that Rorty 
might also ask rhetorically: could anyone other than a liberal be genuinely both 
contextualist and ethnocentrist? So, from antirepresentationalism, which enga-
ges us with the acknowledgment of several languages as several ways of walking 
the world, we arrive at ethnocentrism, which implies a certain fixation to the 
vocabulary of a specific community. From there we come to liberalism, which 
conciliates us with the spirit of tolerance.2
On the other hand, by the end of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Rorty 
unfolds another way in which the risk of cultural immobility that comes with 
ethnocentrism can be overcome through liberalism. This overcoming does not 
focus on the idea of tolerance, but rather, through its characterization of the 
notion of moral progress, on the concept of solidarity. Rorty’s idea (taken from 
Sellars) is to understand moral obligation using the notion of “we-intentions” 
as the starting point, to consider that in this field the crucial explanatory term 
is “one of us”, as opposed to a specific “them”. Rorty denies that the expression 
“one of us human beings” (as opposed to animals, vegetables or machines) is 
stronger than, for example, the expression “we, Latin-Americans” (as opposed to 
Americans, Europeans, etc.). The strength of “us” resides in its capacity of being 
opposed to a “them” that is also made up of human beings: the wrong species 
1  See (Rorty, 2000a) and (Rorty, 2000b).
2  It is important to insist that it is not a deduction from liberal politics based on the 
assumption of antirepresentationalism. In Rorty’s opinion, liberal democracy, “although it 
may need philosophical articulation, it does not need philosophical back up”. And he adds, 
“on this view, the philosopher of liberal democracy may wish to develop a theory of the 
human self that comports with the institutions he or she admires. But such a philosopher is 
not thereby justifying these institutions by reference to more fundamental premises, but the 
reverse: he or she is putting politics first and tailoring a philosophy to suit” (Rorty, 
Objectivity, 178). This inversion in the order of priorities backs the sole justification that 
pragmatism may put forward before other philosophical theses; i.e., a pragmatic justification: 
the fact that it is a more useful description. For what is it more useful? For liberal democratic 
politics, notes Rorty. Such usefulness is based on a weak connection between pragmatism and 
liberalism insofar as, according to Rorty, “both are expressions of, and reinforce, the same sort 
of suspicion of religion and metaphysics” and “both can be traced back to some of the same 
historical causes (religious tolerance, constitutional democracy, Darwin)” (Rorty, 1996: 
73-74).
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of human beings. To appeal to a more restricted “us” than that of “us, human 
beings” is to succeed in terms of moral and political persuasion, strengthening 
the feeling of solidarity. 
Rorty is fully aware that this stance may carry with it the already mentioned 
undesirable trait of ethnocentrism, that is, the trait that leads a culture to close 
upon itself. Such danger can be avoided, according to Rorty, once again, by 
developing the culture of which we feel inheritors, that is, liberal democratic 
Western cultures. A culture that, precisely, has developed the lexicon of solida-
rity. Therefore, the aim is to reconcile what has been said about the idea of “us”, 
with the exhortation that we extend our sense of “us” to the people we used to 
consider as “them”.
This exhortation connects with Rorty’s definition of a liberal as someone for 
whom cruelty is the worst thing that can be done.3 In fact, Rorty accounts for 
a sense of moral progress in the direction of greater human solidarity, although 
such solidarity cannot consist of the recognition of an essence present in all 
human beings, but should be conceived as “the capacity to perceive each time 
more clearly that the differences of tradition (tribal, religion, race, customs, and 
such) have no importance when compared to the similarities that refer to pain 
and humiliation” (Rorty, 1989: 192). Broadening the extension of “us” means, 
then, seeing “them” as part of “us, those capable of feeling pain and humiliation.” 
We must sharpen our imagination in order to notice formerly unperceived varie-
ties of pain and humiliation.4
Consequently, we see that the risk of dogmatism or of cultural stagnation is 
gone if those two liberal features highlighted by Rorty are unfolded: tolerance 
and solidarity. I am interested in distinguishing them at this point, because, 
although they are connected, they entail different conceptual and intersubjective 
procedures. In the first case –the practice of tolerance– it is about being open to 
3  Ramón del Castillo has pointed out that this definition of “liberal” allows Rorty to present 
in another way the way in which liberalism implies the overcoming of the possible monadism 
of ethnocentrism. In his words: “There is no neutral, non-circular way of defending the claim 
that cruelty is the worst thing we can do and that we have an obligation to avoid it. This 
statement is made using the lexicon with which people in certain provinces of the world are 
socialized, but it is a lexicon that - as Rorty says - serves to distrust provincialism” (Del 
Castillo, 2015: 97).
4  See (Penelas, 2014) for a presentation of Rorty’s project as a form of agonism along with a 
critique of certain paradoxes that the focus on humiliation can generate.
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the voice of others; whereas in the second, it is about expanding our conceptual 
resources in order to eliminate cruelty.
I believe that a good way of separating these two liberal tasks is to associate 
them to Miranda Fricker’s treatment of two types of what she calls Epistemic 
Injustice. That is, cases where we can detect “a wrong done to someone speci-
fically in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker, 2007: 1). According to Fricker, 
there are two basic ways in which this kind of injustice can thrive: testimonial 
injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In her own words:
Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a 
deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice 
occurs at a prior stage, when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts 
someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their 
social experiences. An example of the first might be that the police do not 
believe you because you are black; an example of the second might be that 
you suffer sexual harassment in a culture that still lacks that critical concept. 
We might say that testimonial injustice is caused by prejudice in the eco-
nomy of credibility; and that hermeneutical injustice is caused by structural 
prejudice in the economy of collective hermeneutical resources (Ibid.).  
Given these definitions, it is clear to me that what we showed further up 
as a policy of tolerance, that is, the kind of openness to other voices that Ror-
ty highlights as a liberal way of overcoming ethnocentric closure, may also be 
presented in terms of the practice of overcoming testimonial injustice.5 On the 
other hand, the policy of solidarity, that is, the liberal practice of increasing our 
empathy through considering forms of cruelty not previously conceptualized, 
5  Christopher Voparil has questioned the Rortyan conception of cultural politics by 
presenting a series of limitations among which he emphasizes that this conception is not 
entirely capable of capturing the idea that “we must be open to joining the conversations of 
others rather than asking them to join ours “. According to Voparil, “Rorty’s political vision 
of a global liberal utopia seeks to subsume everyone under a grand ‘we’ “, a “we” modeled 
with the vocabulary of the intellectuals of the social-democratic democracies of the West 
(Voparil, 2011: 125). Similar considerations can be found in other texts, although they 
usually emphasize the commitment attributed to Rorty to the idea of  the imposition of our 
own “we” to others (e.g. Janack, 1998). If these criticisms were acceptable, we would be faced 
with a strong objection according to which the policy of Rortyan tolerance is unable for 
creating the conditions for testimonial justice. For a defense of Rorty from such criticisms 
see, for example, (Hollinger, 1993) and (Baruchello & Weber, 2014).
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is easily describable within the range of practices that contest hermeneutical 
injustice. Needless to say, the policy of tolerance is intimately connected to that 
of solidarity. Very often, de-articulation of deafness as regards a given individual 
or collective who voice their experience in the public arena is achieved through 
dismantling prejudices based on forms of cruelty not previously perceived. This 
does not rule out, though, that we may mark the difference between those two 
practices and relate them, respectively, to policies aimed at overcoming testimo-
nial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. 
I will focus on Fricker’s characterization of this latter form of epistemic injus-
tice, because I believe her description of the way in which hermeneutical injustice 
is overcome is very similar to the kind of considerations made by Rorty when he 
thinks that social transformation requires a phase of re-elaboration of our own 
appreciation of certain practices from the perspective of cruelty.6 
2. Hermeneutical Injustice and Liberal Redescription
Fricker narrows her definition of hermeneutical injustice in the following 
terms: “the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience 
obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice 
in the collective hermeneutical resource” (Ibid.: 155). Consequently, overcoming 
hermeneutical injustice requires the collective consolidation of an epistemic and/
or moral virtue, the virtue of having developed an “alertness or sensitivity to the 
possibility that the difficulty one’s interlocutor is having as she tries to render 
something communicatively intelligible is due not to its being nonsensical or 
her being a fool but rather to some sort of gap in the collective hermeneutical 
resources” (Ibid.: 169); virtue that does not suffice, however, given that, as Fricker 
rightly warns, “hermeneutical marginalization is first and foremost the product 
of unequal relations of social power more generally, and as such is not the sort 
of thing that could itself be eradicated by what we do as virtuous hearers alone” 
(Ibid.: 174).
6  An objection to the proposal developed in this paper could be based on the fact that 
Fricker herself has questioned the possibility of giving rise to the idea of epistemic injustice 
from ethnocentric positions such as Rorty’s ones (Fricker, 2017: 54-55). See (Dieleman, 
2017) for, in my opinion, an appropriate reply to that type of suspicion.
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Having said that, besides the virtuous alert attitude described by Fricker, 
what is ultimately required in order to overcome the experience of being una-
ble –be it in the first or third person position– to conceptualize certain areas of 
experience, is the acquisition of the necessary linguistic-narrative resources to 
generate the concepts that result in a productive interpretation of the situation 
experienced. Fricker’s example is the epistemic, moral and political leap produced 
by the irruption of the notion of “sexual harassment” (in reference to the Carmita 
Wood case)7 as the words to name what used to be nameless and, consequently, 
could not even be experienced in its full victimizing dimension. 
Fricker’s considerations around hermeneutical injustice are, to my judgment, 
exactly the ones that Rorty pointed out since Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. 
Indeed, according to Rorty, the process of political change, within the “unavoida-
ble obligation of reducing cruelty” that concerns every liberal, has to be preceded 
by an act of imagination that allows us to perceive acts of cruelty which only 
met blindness before or, simply, for which normal discourse had no words. Thus, 
the practice of redescription becomes an instrument of social transformation. 
Building a language able to formulate previously untold redescriptions, where 
cruelty can be seen where it used to be unimaginable, is something that has 
public consequences. If the ironist attitude of the strong poet is the one that tra-
ins us in the redescriptive task, there is a passage from private ironism to public 
life, since redescription is capable of generating the conditions for denouncing 
heretofore un-conceptualized cruelty.8
I believe that two kinds of redescriptive practices can be distinguished accor-
ding to the purposes they pursue:
Ironist redescription: seeking to renovate the terms that matter in the private forum. 
Liberal redescription: seeking to modify the extent of application of the term 
“cruelty”. 9
7  Wood gave in her resignation to a post at Cornell University because of the unending 
sexual attention she was subjected to by one of the officials and after the University refused 
to transfer her far away from him. She was also denied unemployment insurance because the 
University alleged that her renunciation was due to personal reasons. The concept of “sexual 
harassment” appeared all through the demand presented by Wood against Cornell University.
8  For a detailed analysis of the political role of the idea of “redescription” in Rorty’s work, 
see, among other texts, (Voparil, 2006: 37-54) and (Calder, 2007).
9  I gave a detailed justification of this distinction in “The Cruelty of Irony”. I presented that 
text in the International Conference “After Irony: Discourse, Forms of Life and Politics”, 
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My point here is that the practice of liberal redescription allows to overcome 
situations of hermeneutical injustice. The connection between what is exposed 
by Fricker and Rorty can be deployed if we pay attention to the opinion of the 
author of Epistemic Injustice about the rise and reach of hermeneutical injustice: 
hermeneutical injustice, whether incidental or systematic, involves no 
culprit. No agent perpetrates hermeneutical injustice—it is a purely struc-
tural notion. The background condition for hermeneutical injustice is the 
subject’s hermeneutical marginalization. But the moment of hermeneutical 
injustice comes only when the background condition is realized in a more or 
less doomed attempt on the part of the subject to render an experience inte-
lligible, either to herself or to an interlocutor. The hermeneutical inequality 
that exists, dormant, in a situation of hermeneutical marginalization erupts 
in injustice only when some actual attempt at intelligibility is handicapped 
by it (Ibid.: 159).
It is in this instance of indetermination of the intelligibility of experience 
where the need for redescriptive liberal practice breaks in: the practice that, from 
metaphorical imagination, seeks to crystallize new material inferences in which 
the expression “cruelty” is involved.  At this point, it is relevant to clarify that, 
even under the definition of liberal redescription in terms of “extent for the 
application of the term ‘cruelty’”, this does not mean that it might not generate 
conceptual changes. If one were to adhere to an inferentialist semantics like that 
acknowledged by Rorty through Brandom, the change based on the extensional 
application of a word would produce, at the end of the day, a genuine concep-
tual transformation.10 It is possible to defend the idea that there is a reflexive 
equilibrium in the practice of extending the application of a word, because this 
practice could be described in the following terms: first, one begins with certain 
paradigms of the use of the term “cruelty” (“paradigms” in the sense of certain 
examples of applications of the term which are used as canonical, evaluating 
their similarity in order to accept or reject other applications); second, one expe-
riments with a novel application; finally, one connects it to the previous para-
which was organized by Ramón del Castillo at UNED, Madrid, 2015. The article remains 
unpublished.
10  See (Brandom, 2000: chapter 1).
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digms. This practice can, and often does, generate a process in which paradigms 
are modified,11 as in the case of Carmita Wood, where it was possible to go from 
“flirting” to “cruelty” through the incorporation of “sexual harassment” to the 
standing inferential practices. 
Rorty assumes that such passage usually implies a stage of deep conceptual 
experimentation, even of pure nonsense. Here he echoes the words of Marilyn 
Frye when she describes her own writing as “a sort of flirtation with meanin-
glessness - dancing about a region of cognitive gaps and negative semantic spaces, 
kept aloft only by the rhythm and momentum of my own motion, trying to 
plumb abysses which are generally agreed not to exist” (Frye, 1983: 154). The-
refore, in Rorty’s words:  
There is no method or procedure to be followed except courageous and 
imaginative experimentation. […] [M]eaninglessness is exactly what you 
have to flirt with when you are in between social, and in particular linguistic, 
practices - unwilling to take part in an old one but not yet having succeeded 
in creating a new one. […] Drop the appeal to neutral criteria […]. Instead, 
just make invidious comparisons between the actual present and a possible, 
if inchoate, future (Rorty, 1998: 217).
Now, besides this condition prior to political change, consisting in the ima-
gination being alert to new ways of cruelty, the same transformation in the 
public field is cut across by another phase of the imagination. In Rorty’s view, 
when it comes to criticizing the practices and language of the community one 
belongs to, such criticism “can only take the form of imagining a community 
whose linguistic and other practices are different from our own, […] once one 
sees the need for something more than an appeal to rational acceptability by the 
standards of the existing community, then such an act of imagination is the only 
recourse” (Ibid.: 214). Rorty’s idea, stemming from his antirepresentationalism, 
is to differentiate radicalism from utopianism, with the intention of defending 
the adoption of the latter and not the former: 
11  See (Penelas, 2012).
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Radicals think that there is a basic mistake being made, a mistake deep 
down at the roots. They think that deep thinking is required to get down to 
this deep level, and that only there, when all the superstructural appearances 
have been undercut, can things be seen as they really are. Utopians, however, 
do not think in terms of mistakes or of depth. They abandon the contrast 
between superficial appearance and deep reality in favor of the contrast bet-
ween a painful present and a possibly less painful, dimly seen future (Ibid.). 
Radicalism seems useless to Rorty for political transformation, at least if it 
is not accompanied by the utopian moment that consists in imagining alterna-
tives. Uncompromising radicalism can lead to the desire for “total revolution”, 
which consists in expecting “some” revolution, without engaging in any concrete 
alternative of change and, hence, inadequate as a motor for action, a severe sin 
for a pragmatist.12 
We notice, then, that the road to political and social transformation is 
understood, by way of Rortyan liberalism, as the sum of two different applica-
tions of the imagination. Let us call the first one “critical imagination”: it serves, 
via the liberal redescription device, to perceive new ways of cruelty that permit 
12  The utopian/radical distinction should not be confused with the reform/revolution 
distinction. The first refers to the presence or absence of viable alternatives to the status quo, 
the second refers to the possibility or not of escaping violence for political and social 
transformation. Rorty has pointed out on several occasions that he does not impugn 
revolutionary politics per se. In 1990 he wrote: “This is not to say that there is any particular 
reason for optimism about America, or the rich North Atlantic democracies generally [...] 
But at the present time the United States is still a functioning democratic society - one in 
which change occurs, and can be hoped for, as a result of persuasion rather than force”. 
However, that statement did not prevent him from pointing out the following: “Several of 
these democracies, including the United States, are presently under the control of an 
increasingly greedy and selfish middle class - a class which continually elects cynical 
demagogues willing to deprive the weak hope in order to promise tax cuts to their 
constituents. If this process goes on for another generation, the countries in which it happens 
will be barbarized. Then it becomes silly to hope for reform, and sensible to hope for 
revolution” (Rorty, 1991a: 15 n29). In the same sense, Rorty had already pointed out in 
Contingecy, Irony and Solidarity that “it is hard to imagine a diminution of cruelty in 
countries like South Africa, Paraguay and Albania without violent revolution” (Rorty, 1989: 
63 n21). As Giorgio Baruchello and Ralph Weber have pointed out in relation to Rorty’s 
reformist commitment, we must keep in mind that “he has historicized his own position, 
giving it the status of a suggestion, an argument f shorts, underlining that it is too contingent 
as much as anything else” (Baruchello & Weber, 2014: 209).
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to overcome the different displays of hermeneutical injustice. The second one, 
let us call it “utopian imagination”, arises from the need to overcome the con-
ditions that enable the actions of perceived cruelty. It advances by imaginatively 
developing alternative and feasible communities in which those conditions do 
not apply.
The role played by the notion of cruelty in this process is crucial. Liberals, as 
defined by Rorty, cannot forswear the will to perceive kinds of cruelty previously 
unnoticed and, thus, must be cautious and predisposed to any redescription that 
may shed some light on cruelty in unpredicted areas. Consequently, she must 
open her imagination so that cruelty doesn’t pass her by. On the other hand, once 
those inferential practices produced by redescription are accepted and experien-
ced, she must embark on the utopian adventure. Resignation to what is given is 
the temptation that must be avoided. In any case, unconcerned liberals because 
of lack of imagination are those who have not experienced the moment of cri-
tical imagination or have not given enough credit to the redescriptions brought 
about by such moment. Once cruelty has been illuminated, the lack of imagined 
alternatives cannot be experienced as anything but a burden.
3. The Articulation of Critical and Utopian Imagination
An issue that merits special attention in the Rortyan proposal is that, given 
his critique of radicalism, there is a tension in his work between, on the one 
hand, the account of the moment when liberal redescription develops as a stage 
marked by indeterminate experimentation and, on the other, his presentation of 
the second moment of imagination, the utopian moment, as a criterion of legi-
timation of the redescriptions to be considered. To see this, let us pay attention 
to the way Rorty unfolds his criticism of Marxism.
Rorty’s critique of Marxism aims to place it within the spectrum of unmas-
king metaphysical philosophy, that is, the philosophical strategy that intends to 
account for certain hidden realities behind immediate appearances, which dates 
back to Plato. The antirepresentationalist turn is its antithesis. I shall not discuss 
the relevance of this criticism. I will simply question whether this critique suffi-
ces, from a Rortyan pragmatist point of view, to get rid of all Marx and Marxism 
have striven to highlight. Indeed, as Rorty rightly says, “the metaphysician also 
redescribes, even when he does it in the name of reason and not in the name 
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of imagination” (Rorty, 1989: 90). To accuse someone of being “metaphysical” 
only means, “you also redescribe imaginatively”, but it is not enough if what we 
want to say is “your redescription is useless”.
What I am trying to get at is to point out a way to understand the meaning 
of Bernard Shaw’s following consideration: “Das Kapital is one of those books 
that would change people’s minds if they could be persuaded to read it” (Shaw, 
1993: 340). I believe that, other than saying that every reader of Capital would 
understand and feel comfortable inside the difficult passageways of Marxist 
theory, what the quotation states is that those who read the book might start 
seeing the capitalist production system as intrinsically cruel, beyond the issue 
of fairness or unfairness of salaries. They would mention the fact that the book 
allowed them to redescribe certain practices in terms of cruelty. My idea is that 
Capital can be counted among those books that have shown us who are the 
ones that suffer (Rorty´s examples of that kind of books include: The Making 
of the English Working Class, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Discipline and Punish, 1984, 
etc.). It is worth remembering that Rorty made a similar move, ten years after 
the fall of the Wall, when he vindicated The Communist Manifesto in his essay 
“Failed Promises, Glorious Hopes”.13  
Wondering why Rorty not only does not mention Capital but also voices 
misgivings about the relevance of reading it,14 is tantamount to asking why 
he does not admit or even contemplate the possibility of considering the 
phenomenon of surplus value as an expression of cruelty. It is obvious that 
the omission cannot be based on the assessment that such a phenomenon is 
not something real, given the antirepresentationalist standpoint Rorty comes 
from. Neither can he, in view of his pragmatism, account for its omission 
saying that it is a useless redescription, because its utility can only be meas-
ured by its efficacy in changing our perspective on certain practices. Efficacy 
which was proved by the immeasurable amount of people and communities 
that have “changed their minds” by apprehending such redescription. Reject-
ing the obstacles of Marxist theory, with the goal of avoiding any possible 
metaphysical outlines it may have, and only preserving the fact that Marx 
has widened our imagination by giving us the metaphors/tools necessary to 
realize certain redescriptions in terms of cruelty allows us to abandon the 
13  See (Rorty, 1999: 201-9).
14  See (Rorty, 1999: 210-22).
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idea that the omission at stake is a consequence of assuming an anti-essen-
tialist antrepresentationalism.
So, let us pay close attention to the following statements made by Rorty:15 
Left wing intellectuals will need time to make the psychoanalytic and 
terminological readjustment that may allow them to conceive that there is 
no alternative to capitalism. The left will have to learn to be more modest: 
in the present day, nobody proposes anything better than market economy 
(Uzan, 1992: 5). 
I understand that the failure of socialism suggests that world economies 
will always be market economies, or, at least, should always be market eco-
nomies; that a substitute for private property does not exist (Pomeraniec 
and Tabarovsky, 1996: 2). 
How does Rorty account for these statements? For the sake of consistency, 
he cannot base the absence of alternatives on anything other than the lack of 
utopian imagination. In his discussion with Nancy Fraser, one of his left-wing 
feminist critics, he points out:
She sees, and I do not see, attractive alternatives (more or less Marxist in 
shape) to such institutions as private ownership of the means of production 
and constitutional democracy, attractive alternatives to the traditional social 
democratic project of constructing an egalitarian welfare state within the 
context of these two basic institutions. I am not sure whether our differenc-
es are due to Fraser’s antifoundationalist theory hope or to my own lack of 
imagination (Rorty, 1998: 209 n.15).
15  There are numerous quotes with similar contents in Rortyan works but I have chosen to 
select these two examples because Rorty used those words in interviews by newspapers in my 
country, Argentina. They were held after the fall of the Berlin Wall, at a time when my 
country displayed neo-liberal policies that soon led the country to the harshest financial crisis 
in its history, producing untold levels of poverty and inequality.
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The acknowledgment of this lack of imagination (at some point related by 
him to his condition as a First World citizen when he said: “if there is hope it 
lies in the imagination of the Third World” (Rorty, 1991b: 192)) can’t take the 
appearance of lightness it has in his writings if it isn’t traced back to some criteria 
that points to reject the liberal redescription that consents the inference from 
“salaried work” to “cruelty” through the introduction of the expression “surplus 
value “ (analogous to the redescription that went from “flirting” to “cruelty” via 
“sexual harassment”).
As I said, it is not my intention to focus on the Rortyan criticism of Marxism 
but, rather, to use it as an example to extract a general consequence for imagi-
native dialectics as conceived by Rorty. In fact, Rorty’s strategy to leave aside the 
Marxist description of surplus value in terms of cruelty is to deny it any critical 
potential insofar as it is not coupled by market economy alternatives. Imagina-
tion of the cruel is subsumed to the imagination of the alternative: a liberal redes-
cription will only be legitimate if it is accompanied by the delineation of feasible 
alternatives to the practices that such redescription has exposed as cruel. Having 
said this, we must not trivialise the idea of utopian imagination since it might be 
argued that imagining alternatives is no tiresome task (in fact, Marxism devised 
the communist utopia). Once we have spotted whatever we find condemnable, 
it is not hard to imagine a world where such factor would not be present.  The 
trouble lies in imagining the actual steps to be taken to arrive at that world. 
Therefore, utopian imagination actually unfolds in two phases: imagining the 
ends and imagining the means. Apparently Rorty’s point is that, given his adop-
tion of the Deweyian concept of the ends-means continuum and that there are 
no fixed ends but, rather, ends-in-view,16 any form of utopian imagination that 
fails in the phase of imagining the means should be impugned. That is the idea 
behind the critique of radicalism and the political stress on movements instead 
of campaigns. The point is that Rorty does not merely question the projects that 
fail to articulate an adequate utopian imagination; in his view, such impugnation 
should serve as the basis to devaluate the relevance of the end product of the 
critical imagination that originated such failed utopian enterprise. 
 Indeed, the viability of the utopian imagination, specifically in the phase 
of designing the means, (which does not involve mere fixed ends, but rather, 
ends-in-view under the adoption of the Deweyian concept of the ends-means 
16  See (Dewey, 1988).
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 continuum) presents itself as a criterion for the evaluation of the legitimacy/
utility of critical imagination (the one applied in the procedure of liberal redes-
cription). It would appear that the connection between the two types of imagi-
nation is exactly the opposite. The point seems to be that no one can imagine 
alternatives seen as legitimate if he has not previously perceived the intrinsic 
cruelty of the status quo because the legitimacy of the alternative posited will be 
judged according to the current standards. If such standards were not previously 
acknowledged as cruel, any change proposed, including the means suggested, 
will be assessed from within the paradigm that does not see or underrates the 
cruelty at stake.  Acknowledging the cruelty ingrained in a system is the major 
anomaly that leads towards paradigmatic change in politics. An utopian proposal 
can only be judged feasible within the framework of such change. Consequently, 
the moment when cruelty is imagined always comes first in the order of legiti-
mation, before the moment when alternatives are imagined. The latter cannot 
judge the former.
 The other crucial problem posed by taking an utopian action plan dee-
med feasible as a criterion for legitimising critical imagination is that those who 
propose a redescription of practices in terms of cruelty, even without positing 
alternatives, should be stimulated because they are the condition of possibility of 
moral progress. This is seen more clearly if we remember that Rorty himself held 
that critical imagination needs to be unfolded without many bindings, hosting 
nonsense, assuming that metaphor is but an annoying noise that doesn’t entail 
new meanings, which is the same as saying that a metaphor cannot be discarded 
qua metaphor. Rorty might point out that there are two moments: the first one, 
strictly metaphorical, the moment of the irruption of expressive novelty, of expe-
rimental probing, and the second one, the one of literalization of the metaphor, 
the latter being the one that must be governed by the restriction of the viability 
of utopian imagination. But I believe that even if a liberal metaphor (which 
generates unexpected distortions in the semantic field of “cruelty”) should reach 
a certain level of literalization –in the sense that a given sector of society starts 
playing the game of the newly instituted inferences– it could be said that, even 
if such metaphor were unable to articulate itself into a clear and realistic utopian 
alternative, discarding it ipso facto would be a premature movement within the 
context of the economy of liberal imagination.
Rorty might insist saying that continuing with redescriptions without their 
respective utopian correlative is, after a while, a waste of time. Time that should 
be destined to utopias that can lead to the proposal of actual and viable steps 
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that will allow to overcome cruelties revealed after the process of elimination of 
hermeneutical injustice and that, shallow as they might seem, are of no minor 
importance in the lives of millions of people. This Rortyan insistence has, to my 
judgment, but one problem: it collides with Rorty’s own statements, such as the 
following: 
Still, all that we liberal intellectuals in the States can imagine doing is 
building up the welfare state by e.g. passing a national health insurance law, 
starting an employment program for the ghetto blacks, and the like. But 
even if all our dreams of such laws and programs were fulfilled, this would 
leave the underlying political problem untouched: the emergence of a global 
call of the superrich, a class to which only a few privileged Americans will 
belong, leaving the rest of the American electorate to experience an econo-
mic insecurity which endangers democratic consensus (Rorty, 1997: 287). 
This Rortyan acknowledgment of the unfeasibility of the social-democrat 
utopia, let alone the communist/socialist one, should be understood, in order to 
be consistent, as a condemnation of any attempt of critical imagination to devise 
Rorty’s greatest, no-time-waster, obsession throughout his life: to build a liberal 
redescription of economic inequality as inherently cruel. If such acknowledgment 
were challenged, even assuming pessimism as regards the future, then Rortyan 
liberalism should be more generous when it comes to evaluate the activism of 
those who find their support in the exercise of critical imagination and cannot 
offer but a babble of utopian imagination.
 However, I believe that the deficiency of Planning Criterium to demarcate 
the scope of the legitimacy of liberal redescriptions is only fully dimensioned 
once it is noticed what was said above, that is, that the effective exercise of cri-
tical imagination must be conceptually assimilated to the task of overcoming 
hermeneutical injustice. In this way, such assimilation should not be evaluated 
merely as a correlation of Rorty’s work with Fricker’s inshigt; on the contrary, 
this correlation sheds light on certain limitations of Rortyan meliorism.
 Indeed, the presentation of Rortyan conception of moral and political pro-
gress in terms of two moments, that of the critical imagination and that of the 
utopian imagination –and the understanding of the first one in consonance 
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with the identification and overcoming of a stage in which a certain herme-
neutic injustice governs– allows us to realize something of importance: that 
the result of the exercise of liberal redescription –which involves the passage to 
the discursive circulation of a new concept– cannot be turned back without a 
return to the situation of precedent injustice. The greatest teaching of Fricker, 
by allowing us to observe a type of injustice of a specifically epistemic nature 
that involves testimonial discrimination or lack of certain concepts, is that an 
impoverishment of our linguistic baggage can be in itself a form of subjection. 
The demand to put aside the circulation of certain concepts that were coined and 
that persist in their capacity to allow the enunciation of an experience of harm 
requires firstly pointing out that this conceptual cut does not imply a regression 
towards a situation of hermeneutical injustice. I do not deny that it is possible 
to make a call like that in certain circumstances; still what I think is that it seems 
excessive to defend the idea that the mere fact that we cannot imagine concrete 
ways in which we could arrive in a community where it is not present the type 
of non hermeneutical injustice that the coined concept allows us to enunciate is 
sufficient to claim that the suppression of that concept in our dialogical exchan-
ges does not suppose a return to a situation where an injury is experienced but 
in an ineffable way which gives rise to a hermeneutical submission. Failure of 
our utopian imagination cannot therefore be the basis for justifying that the 
past which was prior to the emergence of the literalized metaphor must not be 
described in terms of hermeneutical injustice. On the other hand, much more 
unacceptable is to say that this failure can justify returning to an earlier stage that 
we have no choice but to describe as unjust from a hermeneutical point of view. 
Thus, Planning Criterium, once we link the concepts of “critical imagination” 
and “hermeneutical injustice”, becomes unviable from the point of view of a 
reformist proposal as intended by Rorty.
If one realizes that Epistemic Injustice was published by Fricker in the same 
year of Rorty’s death, we can point out that the final criticism that I have deve-
loped in this article would not be fair to be thrown to the author of Contingency, 
Irony and Solidarity. We can say that Fricker allowed us to overcome a state of 
hermeneutical injustice, that in which we had no way of conceptualizing a type 
of damage resulting from linguistic-conceptual limitations. So, we can read Rorty 
as another victim of the hermeneutical deficit of our previous philosophical dis-
cursive community. What the argument developed here does allow is to question 
harshly the current persistence of censorship attempts of certain critical discour-
ses that claim to be defended on the basis of some more or less  sophisticated 
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version of Planning Criterium. After Fricker and the discursive fertility of his 
new metaphors it is not possible to continue being Rortyan in the same way.
4. Conclusions
In this paper I set out to show the relevance of the study of epistemic injus-
tice for an adequate articulation of the Rortyan approach to the politics of social 
transformation within the framework of his pragmatist liberalism. The value of 
the concept of hermeneutical injustice was highlighted in order to elaborate the 
concept of policies of solidarity that can be found in Rorty’s work. The distinc-
tions drawn between ironist redescription and liberal redescription and between 
critical imagination and utopian imagination allowed me to identify a tension 
within the Rortyan thought, which manifests itself in the difficulties to put 
together in his project the stimulus to metaphorical experimentation with the 
request to abjure of an useless radicalism. The tension in question arises from 
the identification of what I have called Planning Criterion. My final argument 
makes it possible to revalue the re-reading of Rortyan policies of solidarity in 
terms of hermeneutical injustice, because, once the very idea of that kind of 
epistemic damage is considered, the Planning Criterion becomes morally and 
politically inadmissible. The future bet for Rortyan liberals must be, according 
to this diagnosis, to be able to privilege critical imagination without losing the 
pragmatist perspective.
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